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Rent-Sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: 
Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data
*
 
In many European countries, the majority of workers have their wages directly defined by 
industry-level agreements. In addition, for some workers, industry agreements are 
complemented by firm-specific agreements. Yet, the relative importance of firm and industry 
agreements (in other words, the degree of centralization) differs drastically across industries. 
The authors of this paper use unique linked employer-employee data from a 2003 survey in 
Belgium to examine how these bargaining features affect the extent of rent-sharing. Their 
results show that there is substantially more rent-sharing in decentralized than in centralized 
industries, even when controlling for the endogeneity of profits, for heterogeneity among 
workers and firms and for differences in characteristics between bargaining regimes. 
Moreover, in centralized industries, rent-sharing is found only for workers that are covered by 
a firm agreement. Finally, results indicate that within decentralized industries, both firm and 
industry bargaining generate rent-sharing to the same extent. 
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It is often recommended to decentralize wage bargaining so that firms can better align their 
pay policies with their specific needs. However, as noted by some analysts (OECD 2004, 
Teulings 1998), wage setting decentralization also broadens the scope for local rent-sharing. 
Indeed, if wage bargaining takes place at the firm level, workers (possibly represented by 
trade unions) may be able to extract a larger part of the rents generated by their firms. This 
could have important economic consequences, as it may prevent an efficient allocation of 
labor across firms, increase wage inequality, lead to smaller employment adjustments, and 
affect the division of surplus between capital and labor (Bryson et al. 2006). Surprisingly, 
there is little evidence regarding the impact of wage bargaining structures on rent-sharing. A 
growing body of literature does examine the micro-economic effects of wage bargaining 
institutions on wages. [1] A large number of papers document on the existence of rent-
sharing. [2] Yet, the link between rent-sharing and wage bargaining institutions has almost 
exclusively been analyzed for the Anglo-American world through the comparison of 
unionized and non-unionized sectors. Results suggest that rent-sharing is not a particularity of 
unionized sectors. [3] The distinction according to union status has less meaning for most 
European countries because collective agreements are generally extended to non-unionized 
members. Another particularity of European countries is that collective bargaining occurs at 
multiple levels: at the industry level, union federations and employer associations set wages 
for all workplaces that fall under the scope of the agreement. In addition, firm agreements 
may be concluded at the company level generally to complement industry agreements. The 
impact of bargaining institutions on rent-sharing in European countries has been studied only 
by Gürtzgen (2005). Based on German micro-data for the mining and manufacturing sector, it 
is found that individual wages are positively related to firm-specific quasi-rents in the non-
unionized sector and under firm-specific contracts. Industry-level agreements, however, seem 
to suppress firm-level rent-sharing. [4]   
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One point neglected in Gürtzgen (2005), as in most of the above mentioned literature, is that 
the relative importance of firm and industry agreements differs radically across industries 
(Hendricks and Kahn 1982, Katz 1993, Schnabel et al. 2006). In sectors composed of a large 
number of small and labor-intensive firms, wages are essentially set by industry agreements. 
In contrast, wages are mainly determined at the firm level in industries composed of a small 
number of large and capital-intensive firms. The degree of wage bargaining centralization 
thus varies across industries. So far, the literature on the wage effects of bargaining 
institutions in European countries has focused solely on the impact of the presence of a firm 
agreement in addition to an industry agreement, without considering the centralization 
dimension. This is an important limitation as the level at which wages are bargained does not 
have the same meaning in centralized and decentralized industries. The point is that industry 
agreements set much lower industry standards (i.e. minimum wages by category of workers) 
and are less detailed in decentralized industries. Therefore, industry agreements are more 
often improved at the firm level in decentralized industries. This may be done through 
collective bargaining when there is a firm-level collective agreement or through individual 
bargaining when workers are solely covered by an industry agreement. As a result, the impact 
of industry and firm-level agreements on wages may be very different in centralized and 
decentralized industries. Moreover, since firm agreements are mostly concluded in 
decentralized industries, the literature is not able to disentangle the effect of the level at 
which wages are set and the impact of the degree of centralization of bargaining in the 
industry. This paper is the first to investigate the effects of both of these dimensions of 
collective bargaining on the sensitivity of wages to firm-specific rents. More precisely, we 
address the following questions: 
1) Is there more rent-sharing in decentralized than in centralized industries ?  
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2) Does the presence of a firm agreement (in addition to an industry agreement) similarly 
affect rent-sharing in centralized and decentralized industries ? 
Our analysis is based on a unique linked employer-employee data set for Belgium, a typical 
continental European country regarding wage setting institutions. It resulted from the 
combination of the Structure of Earnings Survey for 2003 and the Structure of Business 
Survey for 2001 and 2003. It provides two interesting variables regarding wage bargaining 
institutions. The first one indicates whether workers in a firm are covered only by an industry 
wage agreement or whether they are additionally covered by a collective wage agreement at 
the firm level. This information is available separately for white- and blue-collar workers. 
Hence, it enables us to overcome a serious misclassification problem encountered in most 
papers on the wage effects of collective bargaining systems. The point is that in many firms, 
blue- and white-collar workers are not covered by the same type of collective agreement 
(industry vs. firm) but such information is often not available in surveys. The second variable 
related to collective bargaining in our survey indicates to which Joint Committee each firm 
belongs. [5] This variable, generally not reported in matched worker-firm data sets, makes it 
possible to identify the precise industry agreement by which each firm is covered. Thanks to 
these two variables, we were able to construct a quantitative indicator of centralization, based 
on the percentage of workers covered by a firm agreement within each Joint Committee. 
Two endogeneity problems may arise when estimating a rent-sharing equation. First, there is 
an accounting relationship between wages and current profits so that profits decrease when 
wages increase. This leads to a downward bias in the coefficient of profits. Second, according 
to efficiency wage theories, an increase in wages may provide workers with incentives to step 
up their efforts. This may lead to an upward bias in the coefficient of profits. To correct these 
endogeneity problems, we applied a two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique, using 2001 
profits as instruments for 2003 profits. Another issue, raised by Card and de la Rica (2006), is  
 
5
that micro-econometric studies of bargaining institutions based on samples of workers may 
potentially confound bargaining status with other firm-level characteristics. We tried to solve 
this problem by using a propensity score matching (PSM) method. This boils down to 
comparing a sample of “treated” workers with a sample of “non-treated” workers who have 
similar observed characteristics. 
Institutional Setting and Theoretical Predictions 
As in many European countries, wage-setting in Belgium occurs at three levels (national, 
industry and firm) in a hierarchical way, so that an agreement concluded at one level cannot 
be less favorable than the upper level agreements. National agreements cover the whole 
country. They set national minimum wages and an upper bound on wage increases that may 
be bargained at lower levels. Industry agreements are concluded within Joint Committees that 
bring together employer and union representatives. They set industry standards (minimum 
wages by category of workers) for all employees covered by the Joint Committee. Finally, 
firm-level agreements may complete industry agreements. The relative importance of 
industry and firm-level agreements varies across industries. [6] Three groups of industries 
can be identified according to the level at which job classifications and regular wage 
premiums are set (Verly 2003):  
1) Industries where such norms are mostly defined at the industry level and applied as such in 
companies. These are mainly the manufacturing industry and industries that essentially 
employ blue-collar workers such as the textile, food, construction, wood and transport 
industries.  
2) Industries where such norms exist at the industry level but are often considered as a 
minimum that has to be improved at firm level. This is mostly the case for industries mainly 
employing white-collar workers.  
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3) Industries where such norms are mostly defined at the company level. These are mainly 
industries consisting of large firms: steel, non ferrous metals, glass, chemicals, paper and 
electricity. 
It is interesting to note that the factors that seem to influence the bargaining structure in 
Belgium are very similar to those that affect the bargaining structure in other industrialized 
countries. According to the literature [7], the main reason for having centralized wage 
bargaining is to keep wages out of competition. In contrast, decentralized wage bargaining is 
more likely to be observed in industries composed of a small number of large and capital-
intensive firms. The reason is that larger firms more often have specific problems to solve 
(Schnabel et al. 2006) [8], and it is less costly for them to have specific pay policies because 
of economies of scale. Moreover, while trade unions generally prefer industry-wide 
bargaining for solidarity purposes, they are generally less resistant to decentralized wage 
bargaining in larger firms where they tend to be better represented. In addition, their potential 
gains from decentralized wage bargaining are larger in more capital-intensive firms because 
the elasticity of labor demand is negatively related to capital intensity.  
While the majority of firms in centralized industries are covered only by an industry 
agreement, the biggest and the most profitable ones are in general additionally covered by a 
firm-specific agreement. Moreover, not all firms in decentralized industries are covered by a 
firm-level collective agreement. In decentralized industries, the absence of a firm agreement 
probably indicates that wages are bargained individually at the firm-level. This is due to the 
fact that industry agreements are generally less detailed and set lower industry standards than 
in centralized industries thus broadening the scope for improvement at the firm-level. 
Which theoretical predictions can be made about the impact of the bargaining structure on the 
extent of rent-sharing ? One can argue that, because industry bargaining cannot take into 
account firm-specific characteristics, the more wages are bargained at the company level, the  
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greater is the scope for rent-sharing. Thus one would expect to find more rent-sharing: i) in 
decentralized than in centralized industries and, ii) within centralized and decentralized 
industries, when a firm agreement is complementing the industry agreement. These 
predictions are, however, not obvious for several reasons. First, there can be mechanisms of 
pattern-setting across firms, as it is the case in Switzerland or Japan, so that the impact of 
decentralization is offset by coordination. Second, it is not certain that, even under 
decentralized bargaining, wages will highly depend on firm-level profits. For example, 
Levine (1993) showed that, in the US, pay policies were more influenced by the wages of 
other workers, within or outside the firm, than by the firm’s own profits. Moreover, according 
to Teulings and Hartog (1998), unions in corporatist countries do not operate as aggressive 
local rent-seekers because they are part of a corporatist structure that provides many 
countervailing incentives that discourage this type of behavior. They illustrate this by 
analyzing wage differentials by bargaining regime in the Netherlands, where the wage setting 
system is very similar to the Belgian one (Van Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996). Finally, as 
stated previously, the presence of a firm agreement (in addition to an industry agreement) 
may not have the same impact in centralized and decentralized industries.  
Data 
The present study is based upon a unique combination of two large-scale data sets. The first, 
carried out by Statistics Belgium, is the 2003 Structure of Earnings Survey (SES). It covers 
Belgian firms employing at least 10 workers with economic activities within sections C to K 
of the Nace Rev.1 nomenclature. The survey contains a wealth of information, provided by 
the management of the establishments, both on the characteristics of the latter (e.g. industry, 
region, type of financial and economic control, size of the establishment) and on their 
workers (e.g. education, age, seniority, gross hourly wages, number of paid working hours, 
sex, type of employment contract, occupation). In addition, it provides two interesting  
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variables regarding wage bargaining institutions. The first one indicates whether workers in a 
firm are covered only by an industry wage agreement or whether they are additionally 
covered by a collective wage agreement at the firm level. This information is available 
separately for white- and blue-collar workers. Hence, it enables us to overcome a serious 
misclassification problem encountered in most papers on the wage effects of collective 
bargaining systems. The point is that in many firms, blue- and white-collar workers are not 
covered by the same type of collective wage agreement (industry vs. firm) but such 
information is often not available in surveys. Given that it is more common that white-collars 
workers receive pay supplements outside of collective agreements, we restrict our analysis to 
blue-collar workers. The second variable related to collective bargaining in our survey 
indicates to which Joint Committee each firm belongs. This variable, generally not reported 
in matched worker-firm data sets, makes it possible to identify precisely by which industry 
agreement each firm is covered. Thanks to these two variables, we are able to construct a 
quantitative indicator of centralization, based on the percentage of workers covered by a firm-
specific agreement within each Joint Committee. Since the SES provides no financial 
information, it has been merged with the 2001 and 2003 Structure of Business Survey (SBS). 
This is a firm-level survey, conducted by Statistics Belgium, with a different coverage than 
the SES in that it includes neither the banking sector, nor the electricity sector, nor firms with 
less than 20 employees. The SBS provides firm-level information on value-added and gross 
operating surplus per employee. After eliminating observations with missing values, 
establishments with less than 5 employees, Joint Committees with less than 5 establishments 
and firms with negative profits in 2001 or 2003 [9], our final sample, combining both 
datasets, covers 26,249 blue-collar workers working in 2,012 establishments. It is 
representative of all blue-collar workers employed in private sector establishments (with the 
exception of the banking and electricity sectors) employing at least 20 workers.  
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Table 1 presents some selected sample statistics broken down by centralized and 
decentralized industries. We consider that an industry is decentralized if more than 50% of 
employees are covered by a firm-specific agreement. [10] The comparison of the statistics 
between the two sub-samples is in line with the literature on the determinants of the 
collective bargaining structure. This confirms that factors influencing the bargaining structure 
in Belgium are quite similar to those identified in other countries. Decentralization of wage 
bargaining seems to be associated with lower labor intensity (the share of labor revenue in 
value added is 61% vs. 68% in centralized industries) and a higher establishment size (132 
vs. 55 employees in centralized industries). Profits are 66% higher in decentralized industries, 
which may be a sign of lower product market competition, which itself may be caused by the 
fact that firms are more concentrated in decentralized industries. According to Katz (1993), 
work organization is another factor to explain decentralization of collective bargaining. We 
indeed observe that the percentage of employees doing team, shift, night or weekend work is 
much larger in decentralized industries (50%) than in centralized industries (18%). The same 
holds true for the percentage of employees with variable pay (30% vs. 12% in centralized 
industries). Finally, we observe that the percentage of female workers is lower (14% vs. 
20%), seniority in the firm longer (11 years vs. 8 years), the percentage of full-time workers 
larger (91% vs. 85%), and the education level higher in decentralized industries. All of these 
characteristics are generally associated with high worker bargaining power. This seems to 
indicate that unions accept forms of decentralization (based on a loosening of industry 
agreements) only if workplace representation is strong (Visser 2005). Further descriptive 
statistics (reported in appendix 2) show that within centralized industries, 14% of firms are 
covered by a firm-specific agreement in addition to the industry agreement. On average, these 
firms are bigger, make more profits and are characterized by a lower degree of labor intensity 
than those only covered by an industry agreement. On average, they also employ more  
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tenured and educated workers, who are more often: i) employed on a full-time basis, ii) doing 
shift, night or weekend work, and iii) receiving variable pay. Overall, it is interesting to note 
that characteristics of firms covered by a firm-specific agreement in centralized industries are 
quite similar to those of firms in decentralized industries.  
Empirical Framework 
To estimate the amount of rent-sharing in Belgium, we rely on the right-to-manage model. 
[11]. Hence, suppose a bargaining situation where a firm’s real profit function is given by: 
() L W L R − = Π                    ( 1 )  
with Π the real profits, R(L) the real revenue, W the real wage and L the employment level. 
Also consider a risk-neutral group of workers, not necessarily a union, that attempts to 












⎛ − + = 1                   ( 2 )  
with N the number of members in the group (0 < L ≤ N) and A the outside option (W > A). 
The outside option is the expected value of real revenue perceived by an individual in case of 
redundancy. It depends positively on the unemployment benefit and on the expected real 
wage that a worker would obtain elsewhere, and negatively on the unemployment rate. The 
model is solved backwards: the profit-maximizing firm determines the employment level, 
given the bargained wage in the first stage of the game. The resulting deal is represented by 
the maximization of the generalized Nash bargain. For a company, without fixed costs, the 
level of utility reached when bargaining fails equals zero. Indeed, since we assume that all 
workers are affiliated to the group, the company will have to cease production if no 
agreement is reached. The fallback position of a representative member of the group is equal 
to A. Accordingly, the generalized Nash bargaining problem can be written as follows [12]:  
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with  [] 1 , 0 ∈ β  the relative bargaining power of the workers in the wage bargain. The first 
order condition of this problem is given by: 
() ()
L
L W L R
A W
−
+ = β                   ( 4 )  
Expression (4) suggests that real wages are affected by the outside option, real profits-per-
employee and the relative bargaining power of workers. 
The corresponding statistical specification, which will serve as a benchmark for our empirical 
analysis, can be written as follows: 
i j j i ij L
Z X w ε β δ δ δ +
Π
+ + + = ) ( 2 1 0                  ( 5 )  
where wij is the logarithm of the gross hourly wage of worker i in firm j, Xi is a vector of 
individual characteristics and working conditions (4 dummy variables for the highest 
completed level of education; prior potential experience, its square and its cube; tenure within 
the current company and its square; sex; 8 occupational dummies; a dummy for part-time 
employment; an indicator showing whether the individual is paid a bonus for shift work, 
night-time and/or weekend work and 3 dummies for the type of employment contract); Zj a 
vector of firm characteristics (2 regional dummies indicating where the establishment is 
located; the size of the establishment; 2 dummies indicating the form of financial and 
economic control and 34 dummies for the sectoral affiliation);  j L
) (
Π
 the logarithm of profits 
per employee in firm j and εij an error term. In a first stage, we estimate this equation by 
ordinary least squares (OLS) with White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. 
Moreover, in order to control for the potential bias deriving from aggregated firm variables in  
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an individual wage specification, standard errors are corrected for within-group correlated 
errors as suggested by Moulton (1990). Results are shown in the first column of Table 2. All 
coefficients have the expected sign and they are generally highly significant. [13] Moreover, 
the adjusted R² reaches almost 50 per cent. Our estimate of the wage-profit elasticity is 0.017. 
This means that on average a doubling of profits-per-worker increases earnings by 1.7%. To 
evaluate the impact of profits on the distribution of wages, Lester’s (1952) range of pay due 
to rent-sharing has been calculated. This statistic indicates the degree to which wages change 
if a worker were hypothetically to move from a low- to a high-rent firm. It is obtained by 




β ˆ 4             ( 6 )  
where  β ˆ  is the estimated wage-profit elasticity, X measures the level of firm profits-per-
employee, and  () X σ  and  X   denote the standard deviation and the mean value of X, 
respectively. On the basis of this formula, it appears that, ceteris paribus, the wage of a 
worker would increase by 10% if he/she switched jobs from a firm whose profits are two 
standard deviations below the mean level of profits to another firm whose profits are two 
standard deviations above the mean.  
Our benchmark regression clearly supports the hypothesis that individual wages are 
significantly and positively related to the firm’s ability to pay. Nevertheless, caution is 
needed. Indeed, two econometric problems arise when using current profits as an explanatory 
variable. First, there is an accounting relationship between wages and current profits: if 
wages increase, profits (i.e. value-added minus remuneration of labor) automatically 
decrease. Therefore, our OLS estimate of rent-sharing is likely to be downward biased. 
Second, a positive relationship between wages and current profits may arise because higher 
wages can provide employees with incentives to step up their effort (cf. efficiency wage  
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theories). This would lead to an upward biased estimation of rent-sharing. In order to correct 
for both problems, we apply 2SLS, using 2001 profits as instruments for 2003 profits. Results 
of our 2SLS regression are presented in the second column of Table 2. We find that the wage-
profit elasticity increases from 0.017 to 0.032, which indicates that our previous estimate was 
downward biased. [14] As a result, Lester’s (1952) range of pay due to rent sharing increases 
from 10% to 19%.  
Rent-sharing by degree of centralization 
To investigate the interaction between rent-sharing and decentralization, we ran the 2SLS 
regression separately for centralized and decentralized industries. The results from this 
analysis, reported in Table 3, indicate that rent-sharing is significantly higher in decentralized 
(wage-profit elasticity of 0.087) than in centralized industries (wage-profit elasticity of 
0.023). 
However, since firm-level characteristics may differ across industries it is not certain that the 
difference in rent-sharing is due to centralization. Indeed, we noted above that decentralized 
industries are characterized by higher profits and apparently stronger workplace 
representation than centralized industries. So it may be that the conditions for rent-sharing are 
less present in centralized industries. In other words, it is not sure that firms currently in 
centralized industries would generate more rent-sharing if they were under decentralized 
bargaining. In order to correctly identify the impact of wage bargaining centralization, we 
used propensity score matching (Heckman et al. 1999). This consists in selecting a sub-
sample of firms from centralized industries to form a control group in the estimation of the 
impact of centralization on rent-sharing. This control group should include firms of 
centralized industries with characteristics close to those of firms of decentralized industries. 
In other words, firms in the control group must have particular features so that their estimated  
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probability of being in a decentralized industry is sufficiently high. This is the case for most 
firms covered by a firm-specific agreement in centralized industries as we saw that their 
mean characteristics are not very different from those of firms in decentralized industries. 
[15] Yet, our control group may also contain a number of firms of centralized industries that 
are not covered by such firm-level agreements. In practice, we used nearest neighbor 
matching with replacement [16]. This implies that first we estimated a propensity score for 
each firm based on its probability of being in a decentralized industry. This is done by the 
estimation of a probit model. Then, for each firm in the decentralized sample, we selected the 
firm in the centralized sample with the closest propensity score [17]. A firm in the centralized 
sample may be used more than once as a match. In the end, we obtain a sub-sample of firms 
from the centralized sample that has the same probability distribution of being in a 
decentralized industry as the sample of “decentralized firms”. Therefore, any remaining 
difference in rent-sharing between the two samples can be attributed to the degree of 
centralization [18]. The variables included in the probit model are those that influence both 
the degree of centralization and the level of rent-sharing. Theoretically, rent-sharing mainly 
depends on the rents generated by the firm and the bargaining power of the workers. These 
variables are also important determinants of the degree of centralization of the industry. 
Hence, the explanatory variables in our probit model include firm-level profits per employee 
and variables that influence or signal worker bargaining power (average tenure in the firm, 
percentage of female workers, proportion of part-time workers, structure of the firm’s 
workforce by type of employment contract and occupation (ISCO 2 digits), establishment 
size, dummies for the firm’s type of financial and economic control and a dummy indicating 
whether the firm is covered by a firm agreement). Moreover, since the degree of 
centralization may also depend on more macro-economic variables, we included dummies for 
the industry (NACE 1 digit) and the region where the establishment is located. Note that  
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these variables can also be considered as proxies for the outside option of the workers in the 
wage bargain. Finally, in order to control for firm-specific wage policies, we controlled for 
the percentage of workers with variable pay. The pseudo R² of our probit regression is 0.30, 
which is quite high compared with other studies on the determinants of the collective 
bargaining structure. [19] As a comparison, in Schnabel et al. (2006), the pseudo R² is 0.23 
and 0.16 respectively for the U.K. and Germany. 13 firms from the decentralized sample 
were dropped because no match close enough was found. For the remaining firms, the 
matches are very close: the mean differences in propensity score between the firms in the 
decentralized and centralized industries is 0.001 and ranges between 0 and 0.099. Of the 
1,669 firms in the centralized sample, 217 were used as a match. 71% of those firms have a 
weight of 1 which means that they are matched to a single decentralized firm. The largest 
weight is 7. For most variables, matching has reduced the differences in mean between the 
two samples: the mean absolute standardized difference decreases from 24% to 8%. [20] 
Table 4 shows that, even when using PSM, the wage-profit elasticity is more than four times 
higher in decentralized than in centralized industries (0.086 vs. 0.021). These findings 
confirm that there is significantly more rent-sharing in decentralized than in centralized 
industries. They provide a counterargument to the one advanced by Teulings and Hartog 
(1998) that unions do not operate as rent-seekers in corporatist countries. Indeed, it seems 
that this depends heavily on the degree of centralization of the industry. 
Rent-sharing by degree of centralization and bargaining level 
In order to verify if the presence of a firm agreement similarly affects rent-sharing in 
centralized and decentralized industries, we further divided the samples according to the level 
at which wage bargaining occurs. Our results, shown in Table 5, indicate that within 
centralized industries there is significantly more rent-sharing in firms covered by a firm- 
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specific agreement than in firms solely covered by an industry agreement (the wage-profit 
elasticity is 0.039 under firm bargaining and 0.020 under industry bargaining). In contrast, for 
decentralized industries, we find that the extent of rent-sharing is not significantly affected by 
the level of wage bargaining. Finally, results show that the wage-profit elasticity is always 
larger in decentralized than in centralized industries regardless the bargaining level. 
It could be argued that these results are biased because firms covered by industry and firm 
agreements have different characteristics. To prevent such a bias, we applied the PSM 
method as in the previous section. The specification of the underlying probit model remains 
almost unchanged. [21] Matching substantially reduces differences in characteristics between 
both samples (industry vs. firm). The mean absolute standardized difference decreases from 
16% to 7% and from 28% to 12% respectively for the centralized and decentralized 
industries. Results obtained with PSM (Table 6) confirm and accentuate the previous ones. 
Within centralized industries, while the wage-profit elasticity stays roughly similar for firms 
covered by a firm agreement, the elasticity decreases from 0.020 to 0.013 and is now only 
significant at the 10% level for firms covered only by an industry agreement. Results thus 
suggest that in centralized industries rent-sharing is essentially a particularity of firms 
covered by a firm-specific agreement. This finding was expected since industry agreements 
do not take into account firm-specific characteristics. In decentralized industries, the 
elasticity rises from 0.049 to 0.116 for firms covered by an industry agreement and remains 
not statistically different from the elasticity of firms covered by a firm agreement (0.110). 
These findings confirm that in decentralized industries both bargaining levels generate rent-
sharing to the same extent. They suggest that workers in decentralized industries, who are not 
covered by a firm-level collective agreement, receive wage supplements paid unilaterally by 
their employer. The fact that these workers also benefit from rent-sharing indicates that pay-




So far, we interpreted a positive wage-profit elasticity as evidence for the fact that workers 
are able to extract a share of the firm’s rents due to their bargaining power. This section 
presents the robustness checks that we ran in order to verify this interpretation.  
A link between wages and profits may derive from employer practices that aim at sharing 
risks with workers and/or at stimulating workers’ productivity. Such practices link wages to 
individual performances, through the use of performance-related pay, or to firm 
performances, for instance through the use of profit-sharing schemes. Both can generate a 
correlation between profits and wages. Moreover, because variable pay is more often used 
under decentralized bargaining than under centralized bargaining [22], it may explain the 
difference in wage-profit elasticity between both regimes. In order to test this hypothesis, we 
ran a specification using a wage variable computed only on the basis of the fixed component 
in pay. Results do not change significantly with this alternative specification. In addition, we 
also estimated the wage-profit elasticity for the sample of firms making losses. If rent-sharing 
is the correct interpretation, wages should not be correlated with firm performances in this 
sub-sample because only profits are shared. On the opposite, if there is risk-sharing, both 
profits and losses are shared so that a positive wage-profit elasticity should be obtained as in 
the case of positive profits. For the 61 firms in our sample making losses in 2001 and 2003, a 
negative elasticity was found. Overall, both robustness tests suggest that the risk-sharing 
interpretation can be rejected. 
A temporary increase in demand on the product market may also explain the positive 
relationship between profits and wages. Indeed, employers facing an increase in demand 
generally first use overtime work instead of directly increasing employment. Because 
overtime work is better paid, wages and profits would rise together. In order to test this 
hypothesis, we estimated our equations with a wage variable computed on the basis of regular  
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hours only. Results reinforce previous findings. Indeed, wage-profit elasticities are almost 
unchanged except for the sample of workers not covered by a firm-specific agreement under 
centralized bargaining. For this sample, the elasticity is no longer statistically significant even 
at the 10% level. [23] 
Conclusion 
The link between rent-sharing and wage bargaining institutions has almost exclusively been 
analyzed for the Anglo-American world through the comparison of unionized and non-
unionized sectors. For most European countries focusing on the union status is not 
particularly interesting as collective agreements are generally extended to non-unionized 
members. The impact of the bargaining regime is therefore better illustrated by the level of 
wage negotiations (industry vs. firm agreements). So far, only one paper has examined how 
rent-sharing is influenced by the level of wage bargaining (Gürtzgen 2005). A major issue 
ignored in this study (as in most of the literature on the wage effects of bargaining 
institutions) is that the degree of wage bargaining centralization substantially varies across 
industries. This is an important limitation as the level at which wages are bargained does not 
have the same meaning in centralized and decentralized industries. The point is that industry 
agreements set much lower industry standards (i.e. minimum wages by category of workers) 
and are less detailed in decentralized industries. Therefore, industry agreements are more 
often improved at the firm level in decentralized industries. This may be done through 
collective bargaining when there is a firm-level collective agreement or through individual 
bargaining when workers are solely covered by an industry agreement. As a result, the impact 
of industry and firm-level agreements on wages is likely to be very different in centralized 
and decentralized industries. Moreover, since most firms covered by a firm-level agreement 
are found in decentralized industries, the literature is not able to disentangle the effect of the  
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level at which wages are set and the impact of the degree of centralization of the industry. 
This paper is the first to investigate the impact of both of these dimensions of collective 
bargaining on the sensitivity of wages to firm-specific rents. More precisely, this paper 
examined the following questions:  
1) Is there more rent-sharing in decentralized than in centralized industries ? 
2) Does the presence of a firm-level agreement (in addition to an industry agreement) 
similarly affect rent-sharing in centralized and decentralized industries ? 
On the basis of detailed matched employer-employee data for Belgium, with unique 
information on collective bargaining institutions, we show that there is substantially more 
rent-sharing in decentralized than in centralized industries, even when controlling for the 
endogeneity of profits, worker and firm heterogeneity, and differences in characteristics 
between bargaining regimes. This finding is not in line with the argument advanced by 
Teulings and Hartog (1998) that unions do not operate as rent-seekers in corporatist 
countries. Indeed, it seems that this depends heavily on the degree of centralization of the 
industry. Moreover, in centralized industries, rent-sharing only concerns workers that are 
covered by a firm-specific agreement. This finding was expected since industry agreements 
do not take into account firm-specific characteristics. Finally, results indicate that within 
decentralized industries, both firm and industry bargaining generate rent-sharing to the same 
extent. They suggest that workers in decentralized industries, who are not covered by a firm-
level collective agreement, receive wage supplements that are paid unilaterally by their 
employer. The fact that these workers also benefit from rent-sharing indicates that pay-setting 
does not need to be collective to generate rent-sharing. This is in line with the Anglo-
American literature showing that rent-sharing is not a particularity of the unionized sector.  
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Overall, our findings indicate that it may be quite misleading to examine the wage effects of 
bargaining institutions in Europe by focusing solely on the level at which wages are 
negotiated (industry- vs. firm-level agreements). Indeed, it is shown that: i) wages are 
substantially influenced by the degree of centralization of collective bargaining in the 
industry and ii) the impact of industry and firm-level agreements on wages is very different in 
centralized and decentralized industries. 
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Notes 
[1] For the Anglo-American world see Andrews et al. (1998), Blanchflower and Bryson 
(2002, 2003), Booth (1995), Bratsberg and Ragan (2002), Forth and Millward (2002), 
Freeman (1980), Freeman and Medoff (1984), Lewis (1986), and Schumacher (1999). For 
continental European countries see Checchi and Pagani (2004), Card and de la Rica (2006), 
Cardoso and Portugal (2003), Dell’Aringa and Lucifora (1994a, 1994b), Dell’Aringa et al. 
(2004), Dell’Aringa and Pagani (2007), Dominguez and Guttiérez (2004), Gerlach and 
Stephan (2004), Gürtzgen (2006), Hartog et al. (2002), Khon and Lembcke (2007), Plasman 
et al. (2007), and Rycx (2003). 
[2] Previous studies on this issue include e.g. Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Arai (2003), Goos 
and Konings (2001), Kramarz (2003), Margolis and Salvanes (2001), Martins (2004), Rycx 
and Tojerow (2004) and Van Reenen (1996). 
[3] See Blanchflower et al. (1990, 1996), Bronars and Famulari (2001), Estevão and Tevlin 
(2003), Hildreth and Oswald (1997).  
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[4] Another paper by Pistoresi and Strozzi (2001) examines the relationship between rent-
sharing and bargaining levels in the metal-mechanical industry in Italy. Given that their data 
contain no information on the bargaining structure, they attribute aggregate changes to 
industry level bargaining and idiosyncratic changes to firm level bargaining. They find no 
evidence of rent-sharing at the company level.  
[5] Joint Committees are permanent bodies at the industry level in which employers' 
associations and trade unions are represented. Their main task is to oversee the conclusion of 
industry collective agreements by the organizations represented. Firms covered by each Joint 
Committee are defined by Royal Decree. It is important to note that Joint Committees do not 
correspond to the economic sectors as defined by the standard NACE nomenclature. 
[6] In the remainder of the paper, the term “industry” refers to all firms covered by the same 
Joint Committee. 
[7] See Booth 1989; Deaton and Beaumont 1980; Heikkilä and Piekkola 2005; Hendricks and 
Kahn 1982; Katz 1993; Schnabel et al. 2006. 
[8] According to Schnabel et al. (2006), large firms have more complex organizational 
structures, more distant personal relationships, and more coordination, monitoring and 
communication costs. 
[9] We keep firms with positive profits because we use the logarithm of the firm’s profits-
per-worker as the main independent variable. We also estimate the wage-profit elasticity for 
firms making losses in 2001 and 2003 (see section on ‘Robustness checks’). 
[10] The proportion of workers covered by a firm agreement in each Joint Committee is 
shown in appendix 1.  
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[11] Using Belgian aggregate data from 1957 to 1988, Vannetelbosch (1996) has shown that 
both the right-to-manage (Nickell and Andrews 1983) and the efficient bargaining 
(McDonald and Solow 1981) models can be rejected in favor of the general bargaining model 
(Manning 1987). This means that the outcome of the bargaining process is located 
somewhere between the labor demand curve and the contract curve. Nevertheless, this result 
must be considered with caution for at least two reasons. First, the estimates are very 
sensitive to the specification of the reservation wage, and second, the trade union density and 
the number of strikes are not a very good surrogate for the relative bargaining power of 
unions. Also noteworthy is that, while these models have different implications for 
unemployment and economic welfare, they generate identical wage equations. Hence, as in 
most empirical papers on rent-sharing, we have chosen to rely on the right-to-manage model. 
For a presentation of theoretical models on rent-sharing see e.g. Blanchflower et al. (1996). 
[12] See Nickell (1999: p.3) for a discussion on the notation. 
[13] Detailed results of all wage regressions presented in this paper are available upon 
request. 
[14] All coefficients in the first-stage regression are jointly significant at the 1% level. The 
adjusted R² stands at 0.65 and the elasticity between current and lagged profits per employee 
is highly significant and equal to 0.618. 
[15] This observation may suggest that if affiliation to a Joint Committee were not 
constrained by economic activity, firms in centralized Joint Committees that are covered by a 
firm-specific agreement would have chosen to belong to a decentralized Joint Committee. 
[16] Of the available matching methods, nearest neighbor matching produces estimates with 
the least bias, but at the cost of a high variance (because only part of the comparison sample 
is used) (Bryson 2002: p.14). Moreover, allowing the non-treated to be used more than once 
as comparators improves the performance of the match (Bryson 2002: p.15).  
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[17] We impose a caliper of 0.01, which means that the difference in propensity score cannot 
exceed 0.01. 
[18] It must be stressed that this is only on the basis of observable characteristics. So if there 
are unobserved characteristics that influence both the degree of decentralization and the level 
of rent-sharing, we cannot exclude that the difference in rent-sharing between the two 
samples is due to differences in those unobserved characteristics.  
[19] Results from the probit estimation are provided in appendix 3.  
[20] The standardized difference is defined as the difference of the sample means in the 
treated (here decentralized) and non-treated (here centralized) sub-samples as a percentage of 
the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated groups 
(Bryson 2002: p. 15). See appendix 4 for a comparison of the sample means before and after 
PSM. 
[21] We do not include the dummy indicating whether a firm is covered by a firm agreement. 
[22] 30% of workers in decentralized industries have a variable component in their pay 
compared with only 12% in centralized industries.  
[23] A third interpretation of a positive wage-profit elasticity, which comes from the 
efficiency wage theory, has already been discussed in the ‘Empirical Framework’ section.  
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Worker Characteristics    
Mean Age  38.09  37.68 
Education Distribution    
  Primary  0.15  0.09 
  Lower Secondary  0.45  0.43 
  Upper Secondary (General)  0.13  0.17 
  Upper Secondary (Vocational)  0.25  0.29 
  Non-University Tertiary  0.01  0.02 
Fraction Female  0.20  0.14 
Contract Distribution    
  Unlimited-Term  0.94  0.96 
  Fixed-Term  0.05  0.04 
  Apprentice  0.001  0.001 
  Other Contract  0.01  0.002 
Fraction Full-Time  0.85  0.91 
Fraction Working in Shift, or During Night or Weekend  0.18  0.50 
Fraction with Variable Pay Component  0.12  0.30 
Mean Tenure (Years)  7.74  10.82 
Occupation Distribution     
  Extraction and building trade workers  0.14  0.01 
  Metal, machinery and related trades workers  0.14  0.08 
  Precision, handicraft, printing and related trades workers  0.04  0.02 
  Other craft and related trades workers  0.14  0.01 
  Stationary plant and related operators  0.04  0.18 
  Machine operators and assemblers  0.14  0.31 
  Drivers and mobile plant operators  0.12  0.21 
  Sales and services elementary occupations  0.11  0.02 
  Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport  0.12  0.16 
Mean gross hourly wages (EUR) 
a 11.63  13.63 
Firm Characteristics    
Mean Establishment Size (Number of employees)  54.87  132.45 
Economic and Financial Control Distribution    
  >50% Privately Owned  0.97  0.92 
  >50% Publicly Owned  0.002  0.02 
  Other Economic and Financial Control  0.03  0.06 
Region Distribution     
  Brussels  0.09  0.10 
  Flanders  0.68  0.55 
  Walloon  0.23  0.34 
Mean firm’s share of labor revenues in value-added 
b 0.68  0.61 
Mean profits-per-employee (EUR) 
c 16,526  27,373 
Number of workers  21,348  4,901 
Number of establishments  1,669  343 
Notes: 
a Gross hourly wage includes overtime paid, premiums for shift, night and/or week-end work, and regular 
bonuses. It does not include irregular payments which do not occur during each pay period, such as pay for 
holiday, 13
th month, profit-sharing, etc. 
b The firm’s share of labor revenues in value added is approximated by 
the firm’s labor costs divided by the firm’s value-added. Profits-per-employee are approximated by the firm’s 
annual gross operating surplus divided by the number of employees in the firm. Data also include information 
on NACE industry (35 categories) and on Joint-Committees (39 categories) affiliations.   
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Table 2: Log Wage Equation, Full Sample 
Dependent variable: 








c 0.017***  0.032*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
Individual characteristics and working conditions 
d Yes  Yes 
Firm characteristics 
e Yes  Yes 
Industry effects 
f Yes  Yes 
Group effects 
g Yes  Yes 
R² 0.46  0.46 
Prob > F  0.00  0.00 
R², first stage  -  0.65 
Prob > F, first stage  -  0.00 
# employees  26,249 
# establishments  2,012 
Notes : * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 ; 
a White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported between brackets; 
b Instruments for 2003 firm profits-per-worker include all explanatory variables in 
equation (5) plus 2001 firm profits-per-worker; 
c Firm annual gross operating surplus per worker ; 
d Dummy for 
sex; 4 dummies for education; prior potential experience, its square and its cube; tenure within the current 
company and its square; a variable showing whether the individual received a bonus for shift work, night work 
and/or weekend work; 3 dummies for the type of contract; a dummy indicating if the worker is part-time and 8 
occupational dummies. 
e Region where the establishment is located (2 dummies); size of the establishment (i.e. 
number of workers); financial and economic control (2 dummies). 
f NACE two-digit industry classification (34 
dummies); 
g Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance components within groups 
developed by Over, Jolliffe and Foster (1996). 
 
Table 3: Log Wage Equation by Degree of Centralization, Before PSM 
Dependent variable: 




 a, b 
Decentralized industries 
2SLS
 a, b 
Profits-per-worker (ln) 
c 0.023***  0.087*** 
 (0.004)  (0.017) 
Individual characteristics and working conditions 
d Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics 
e Yes  Yes 
Industry effects 
f Yes  Yes 
Group effects 
g Yes  Yes 
R² 0.45  0.40 
Prob > F  0.00  0.00 
R², first stage  0.65  0.66 
Prob > F, first stage  0.00  0.00 
# employees  21,348  4,901 
# establishments  1,669  343 
Notes : * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 ; 
a White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported between brackets; 
b Instruments for 2003 firm profits-per-worker include all explanatory variables in 
equation (5) plus 2001 firm profits-per-worker; 
c Firm annual gross operating surplus per worker ; 
d Dummy for 
sex; 4 dummies for education; prior potential experience, its square and its cube; tenure within the current 
company and its square; a variable showing whether the individual received a bonus for shift work, night work 
and/or weekend work; 3 dummies for the type of contract; a dummy indicating if the worker is part-time and 8 
occupational dummies. 
e Region where the establishment is located (2 dummies); size of the establishment (i.e. 
number of workers); financial and economic control (2 dummies). 
f NACE two-digit industry classification (34 
dummies); 
g Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance components within groups 
developed by Over, Jolliffe and Foster (1996).  
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Table 4: Log Wage Equation by Degree of Centralization, Matched Samples 
Dependent variable:  








 a, b 
Profits-per-worker (ln) 
c 0.021***  0.086*** 
 (0.007)  (0.020) 
Individual characteristics and working 
conditions 
d  Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics 
e Yes  Yes 
Industry effects 
f Yes  Yes 
Group effects 
g Yes  Yes 
R² 0.47  0.40 
Prob > F  0.00  0.00 
R², first stage  0.77  0.64 
Prob > F, first stage  0.00  0.00 
# employees  3,241  4,471 
# establishments  217  330 
Notes : * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 ; 
a White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported between brackets; 
b Instruments for 2003 firm profits-per-worker include all explanatory variables in 
equation (5) plus 2001 firm profits-per-worker; 
c Firm annual gross operating surplus per worker ; 
d Dummy for 
sex; 4 dummies for education; prior potential experience, its square and its cube; tenure within the current 
company and its square; a variable showing whether the individual received a bonus for shift work, night work 
and/or weekend work; 3 dummies for the type of contract; a dummy indicating if the worker is part-time and 8 
occupational dummies. 
e Region where the establishment is located (2 dummies); size of the establishment (i.e. 
number of workers); financial and economic control (2 dummies). 
f NACE two-digit industry classification (34 
dummies); 
g Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance components within groups 
developed by Over, Jolliffe and Foster (1996). 
 
Table 5: Log Wage Equation by Degree of Centralization and Bargaining Level, Before 
PSM 
  Centralized industries  Decentralized industries 
Dependent variable: 




















 a, b 
Profits-per-worker (ln) 
c 0.020*** 0.039***  0.049** 0.110*** 
 (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.025)  (0.029) 
Individual characteristics 
and working conditions 
d  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm characteristics 
e  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry effects 
f  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Group effects 
g  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
R² 0.47  0.43  0.45  0.38 
Prob > F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
R², first stage  0.65  0.72  0.84  0.62 
Prob > F, first stage  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
# employees  17,709  3,639  1,825  3,076 
# establishments  1,430  239  164  179 
Notes : * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 ; 
a White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported between brackets; 
b Instruments for 2003 firm profits-per-worker include all explanatory variables in 
equation (5) plus 2001 firm profits-per-worker; 
c Firm annual gross operating surplus per worker ; 
d Dummy for 
sex; 4 dummies for education; prior potential experience, its square and its cube; tenure within the current 
company and its square; a variable showing whether the individual received a bonus for shift work, night work 
and/or weekend work; 3 dummies for the type of contract; a dummy indicating if the worker is part-time and 8 
occupational dummies. 
e Region where the establishment is located (2 dummies); size of the establishment (i.e. 
number of workers); financial and economic control (2 dummies). 
f NACE two-digit industry classification (34 
dummies); 
g Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance components within groups 
developed by Over, Jolliffe and Foster (1996).  
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Table 6: Log Wage Equation by Degree of Centralization and Bargaining Level, 
Matched Samples 
  Centralized industries  Decentralized industries 
Dependent variable: 




















 a, b 
Profits-per-worker (ln) 
c 0.013*  0.040***  0.116***  0.110*** 
 (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.024)  (0.030) 
Individual characteristics 
and working conditions 
d  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm characteristics 
e  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry effects 
f  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Group effects 
g  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
R² 0.49  0.45  0.54  0.38 
Prob > F  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
R², first stage  0.89  0.72  0.90  0.64 
Prob > F, first stage  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
# employees  2,564  3,556  912  2,549 
# establishments  179  233  76  162 
Notes : * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 ; 
a White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported between brackets; 
b Instruments for 2003 firm profits-per-worker include all explanatory variables in 
equation (5) plus 2001 firm profits-per-worker; 
c Firm annual gross operating surplus per worker ; 
d Dummy for 
sex; 4 dummies for education; prior potential experience, its square and its cube; tenure within the current 
company and its square; a variable showing whether the individual received a bonus for shift work, night work 
and/or weekend work; 3 dummies for the type of contract; a dummy indicating if the worker is part-time and 8 
occupational dummies. 
e Region where the establishment is located (2 dummies); size of the establishment (i.e. 
number of workers); financial and economic control (2 dummies). 
f NACE two-digit industry classification (34 
dummies); 
g Group effects estimations use the correction for common variance components within groups 
developed by Over, Jolliffe and Foster (1996).  
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Appendix 1: Proportion of Workers Covered by a Firm Collective Agreement in Each 
Joint-Committee 
N° of the Joint 
Committee 
Denomination of the Joint Committee  Firm agreement 
coverage 
113 Manufacture  of  ceramic  0.00 
125 Manufacture  of  wood  0.00 
307 Insurance  agencies  0.00 
317 Security  activities  0.00 
321  Wholesale of pharmaceutical and medical goods  0.00 
322  Provision of personnel  0.00 
324 Diamond  industry  0.00 
124 Construction  0.03 
302  Hotels and restaurants  0.01 
109  Manufacture of wearing apparel  0.02 
142  Wholesale of waste and scrap  0.03 
149  Activities auxiliary to manufacture of metal, mechanical and 
electrical products 
0.04 
112  Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles  0.05 
100  Auxiliary joint committee for blue collar workers  0.08 
120  Manufacture of textiles and textile products  0.13 
140  Transport (other than public and air transport)  0.14 
126  Manufacture of wood products  0.15 
119  Sale of food and beverage  0.20 
117  Wholesale of fuels  0.21 
121 Industrial  cleaning  0.22 
130  Publishing and printing  0.23 
118  Manufacture of food products and beverages  0.36 
102 Quarrying  of  stone  0.37 
111 Manufacture  of  metal,  mechanical and electrical products  0.47 
110 Textile  cleaning  0.48 
313  Retail sale of pharmaceutical and medical goods  0.48 
114  Manufacture of bricks  0.52 
136  Manufacture of paper products  0.61 
133  Manufacture of tobacco products  0.63 
115  Manufacture of glass and glass products  0.67 
116  Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products, rubber and plastic 
products 
0.68 
328 Public  transport  0.70 
311  Retail sale in big stores (other than supermarkets)  0.77 
105  Manufacture of non-ferrous metals  0.83 
128  Manufacture of leather and leather products  0.86 
315 Air  transport  0.89 
312 Supermarkets  0.96 
104 Manufacture  of  steel  0.98 

























Worker Characteristics       
Mean Age  38.12  37.91  37.59  37.72 
Education Distribution       
  Primary  0.16  0.14  0.14  0.07 
  Lower Secondary  0.46  0.38  0.44  0.42 
  Upper Secondary (General)  0.13  0.15  0.17  0.17 
  Upper Secondary (Vocational)  0.24  0.31  0.22  0.32 
  Non-University Tertiary  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Fraction  Female  0.19 0.24 0.20  0.12 
Contract Distribution       
  Unlimited-Term  0.93  0.95  0.94  0.97 
  Fixed-Term  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.03 
  Apprentice  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Other Contract  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00 
Fraction  Full-Time  0.84 0.88 0.91  0.91 
Fraction Working in Shift, or During Night or Weekend  0.14  0.34  0.42  0.53 
Fraction with Variable Pay Component  0.10  0.20  0.19  0.35 
Mean Tenure (Years)  7.31  9.84  10.06  11.18 
Occupation Distribution         
  Extraction and building trade workers  0.17  0.02  0.01  0.01 
  Metal, machinery and related trades workers  0.14  0.14  0.09  0.08 
  Precision, handicraft, printing and related trades workers  0.03  0.06  0.02  0.02 
  Other craft and related trades workers  0.14  0.13  0.01  0.01 
  Stationary plant and related operators  0.04  0.06  0.20  0.18 
  Machine operators and assemblers  0.11  0.28  0.32  0.28 
  Drivers and mobile plant operators  0.13  0.09  0.16  0.24 
  Sales and services elementary occupations  0.12  0.05  0.03  0.02 
  Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport  0.12  0.17  0.16  0.16 
Mean gross hourly wages (EUR) 
a 11.49  12.31  12.45  14.16 
Firm Characteristics       
Mean Establishment Size (Number of employees)  49.36  116.14  67.94  193.96 
Economic and Financial Control Distribution       
  >50% Privately Owned  0.96  1.00  0.93  0.91 
  >50% Publicly Owned  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04 
  Other Economic and Financial Control  0.03  0.00  0.07  0.05 
Region Distribution         
  Brussels  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.14 
  Flanders  0.68  0.70  0.52  0.59 
    Walloon  0.24 0.22 0.40  0.26 
Mean firm’s share of labor revenues in value-added 
b  0.76 0.73 0.68  0.68 
Mean profits-per-employee (EUR) 
c  16,210 20,031 22,422  34,498 
Number of workers  17,709  3,639  1,825  3,076 
Number of establishments  1,430  239  164  179 
Notes: 
a Gross hourly wage includes overtime paid, premiums for shift, night and/or week-end work, and regular 
bonuses. 
b The firm’s share of labor revenues in value-added is approximated by the firm’s labor costs divided by the 
firm’s value-added. Profits-per-employee are approximated by the firm’s annual gross operating surplus divided by the 
number of employees in the firm.   
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Appendix 3: Probit Model for the Probability of Being in a Decentralized Industry 
Dependent variable: Being in a Decentralized Industry   
Firm Covered by a Firm Agreement  0.733*** 
  (5.08) 
Proportion Female  0.674*** 
  (2.81) 
Proportion Part-Time  0.238 
  (0.71) 
Mean Tenure  0.039*** 
  (3.35) 
Type of contract (reference: Proportion Unlimited-Term)   
Proportion Fixed-Term Contracts  0.931* 
  (1.93) 
Proportion Apprentices  -13.221 
  (-1.58) 
Proportion Other Contracts   0.222 
  (0.2) 
Economic and Financial Control (reference: >50%  Privately Owned)   
>50% Publicly owned  2.040*** 
  (3.53) 
Other Economic and Financial Control  0.827*** 
  (2.7) 
Establishment's size  0.002*** 
  (3.15) 
Establishment's size (squared)  -1.64 e-06** 
  (-2.19) 
Occupation (reference: Proportion Machine Operators and Assemblers )   
Proportion Extraction and Building Trade Workers  -0.658 
  (-1.29) 
Proportion Metal, Machinery and Related Trade Workers  -1.316*** 
  (-5.68) 
Proportion Precision, Handicraft, Printing and Related Trades Workers  -0.680** 
  (-2.32) 
Proportion Other Craft and Related Trades Workers  -1.015*** 
  (-4.36) 
Proportion Stationary Plant and Related Operators  0.658*** 
  (2.65) 
Proportion Drivers and Mobile Plant Operators  -0.339 
  (-1.18) 
Proportion Sales and Services Elementary Occupations  -0.601 
  (-1.54) 
Proportion Laborers in Mining, Construction, Manufacturing and Transports  -0.327 
  (-1.39) 
Profits-per-Employee 1.61  e-06* 
  (1.77) 
Establishment's Region (reference: Flanders )    
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Brussels  0.308* 
  (1.74) 
Walloon  0.518*** 
  (3.68) 
Industry (reference: Manufacturing Sector )   
Wholesale and Retail Trade  0.115 
  (0.7) 
Transport, Storage and Communication  -0.477** 
  (-2.06) 
Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities  -1.185*** 
  (-2.67) 
Proportion with Variable Pay Component  0.215 
  (1.21) 
Constant  -1.785*** 
  (-8.16) 
Number of Observations   1,702 
Wald chi2(30)  336.18 
Prob > chi2  0.00 
Pseudo R2  0.30 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 ; t-stat in parentheses.   
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Firm-level agreement  0.08  0.27  0.41  -0.82  -0.31 
Proportion female  0.19  0.29  0.32  -0.36  -0.11 
Proportion part-time  0.18  0.21  0.21  -0.09  0.00 
Mean tenure  6.74  8.86  10.39  -0.65  -0.26 
Proportion fixed-term  0.05  0.08  0.06  -0.08  0.08 
Proportion apprentice  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.24  0.00 
Proportion other contract  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.09  0.02 
<50% Publicly owned  0.00  0.00  0.02  -0.17  -0.10 
Other Form of Financial control  0.03  0.06  0.06  -0.15  -0.01 
Establishment's size  54.87  102.05  119.61  -0.43  -0.10 
Establishment's size (cubed)  20544.26  33076.76  41844.94  -0.03  -0.01 
Proportion Extraction and building 
trade workers  0.13 0.01  0.01  0.52  0.02 
Proportion Metal, machinery and 
related trade workers  0.17  0.05  0.06  0.44  -0.01 
Proportion Precision, handicraft, 
printing and related trade workers  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.07  0.05 
Proportion Other craft and related 
trade workers  0.13  0.04  0.09  0.14  -0.16 
Proportion Stationary plant and 
related operators  0.03 0.16  0.15  -0.44  0.06 
Proportion Drivers and mobile plant 
operators 0.13  0.09  0.12  0.05  -0.07 
Proportion Sales and services 
elementary occupations  0.15  0.09  0.14  0.02  -0.16 
Proportion Laborers in mining, 
construction, manufacturing and 
transports 0.15  0.25  0.18  -0.12  0.22 
Profits-per-employee 16525.71  26440.09  27373.23  -0.29  -0.03 
Brussels 0.09  0.07  0.10  -0.06  -0.10 
Walloon 0.23  0.34  0.34  -0.24  0.00 
Mining and Quarrying  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00 
Construction 0.16  0.00  0.00  0.61  0.00 
Wholesale and Retail Trade  0.26  0.29  0.32  -0.14  -0.09 
Hotels and Restaurants  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.27  0.00 
Transport, Storage and 
Communication  0.12 0.06  0.10  0.06  -0.08 
Financial Intermediation  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.00 
Real Estate, Renting and Business 
Activities 0.12  0.06  0.02  0.40  0.16 
Proportion with variable pay 
component 0.08  0.12  0.15  -0.23  -0.10 
 